An analysis approach to assess borehole stability following a hypothetical blowout from representative deepwater scenarios is presented. It addresses whether imposed underbalanced conditions cause sufficient instability that the borehole bridges-over and the well kills itself. The approach uses a series of interrelated analyses: (i) analyses of the kick and blowout development are performed predicting how bottom pressure and in-flow velocity changes over time; (ii) underbalanced wellbore failure in exposed shales and sands is then determined; (iii) cavings and produced sand volumes are calculated from the estimated failure zone, and the transport of these materials in the borehole is determined from the predicted hydrocarbon flow rates; and (iv) bridging tendency is assessed by considering the concentration of cavings in either the enlarged borehole or in flow-paths within the well casing or annuli.
Introduction
Uncontrolled influxes of formation fluids into a borehole (a "kick") develop into a blowout when the drilling fluid is fully displaced from the well and the formation fluid exits the well. In the case of subsea deepwater wells, the wellhead is at the sea-floor and is connected to the drill rig by a marine riser. Depending upon the integrity of the well and the riser following a blowout, hydrocarbon discharge may be at the sea-floor, at the rig floor, or at some point in-between. An influx of hydrocarbons, especially gas, is more severe than an influx of overpressured water. Occurrences of over-pressured water ("shallow water flows") or shallow gas influx are well understood from a shallow hazards perspective [1] . Another possible route for hydrocarbons to reach mudline is via an "underground blowout". This occurs when the hydrostatic pressure in the borehole exceeds the fracture gradient of exposed formations. In these circumstances the increased borehole pressure from activating the BOP and killing the flow up the wellbore can cause fracturing of the formation and, depending upon the overburden geology, can result in fractures propagating around the wellbore to seabed.
As a kick develops, the drilling fluid is displaced from the well by the influx of less dense fluids that have a formation pressure greater than the hydrostatic pressure exerted by the drilling fluid. The bottom-hole pressure in the wellbore thus reduces during the developing kick, thereby accelerating the influx. When all the drilling fluid is displaced from the wellbore a condition of unrestricted open flow occurs (i.e. with a hydrocarbon fluid column to the wellhead), and the blowout continues until terminated by natural causes or external intervention. The natural causes of terminating a blowout include depletion (depressurization) of the formation, water breakthrough (particularly in "shallow-hazard" gas blowouts), wellbore collapse or from bridging at choke-points by produced formation solids entrained in the hydrocarbon flow. The size, productivity and over-pressured nature of many deepwater reservoirs preclude depletion and water breakthrough as being viable self-killing methods within acceptable timescales.
This study focuses on whether the reduction in bottom-hole pressure during a blowout would be sufficient to cause the wellbore to collapse and for the produced solids to bridge inside the wellbore. Flak [2] commented that "Ultra-deepwater blowout risk is mitigated by low formation strength. Natural well bridging would shut off most blowouts." However, experiences from deepwater blowouts do call into question whether bridging can be relied upon as a mechanism to limit the duration of blowouts. In deeply-buried Paleocene and Eocene formations in the Gulf of Mexico, or in sub-salt Cretaceous-aged sediments offshore Brazil, stronger, more competent formations, may be less conducive to bridging and self-killing. Therefore, as part of blowout contingency planning, assessing the potential to self-kill should be addressed along with other kill options. In order to address these issues it is considered important that suitable methodologies be devised to assess whether bridging and self-killing may be a viable mechanism for particular well blowout scenarios.
Possible Causes for a Blowout
The main focus for this study is the analysis of blowouts occurring during drilling. Kicks and blowouts occurring during completion, work-over or abandonment operations are outside the scope of this work, as they would be unlikely to involve the possibility of formation failure as a self-killing mechanism. (The prevalence of sand-control completions in deep-water makes it unlikely that significant volumes of formation could be produced into the wellbore, even during a kick when running the completion).
Inevitably, for a blowout to occur during drilling operations a number of cascading failures have to happen. These likely will involve both failures of human decision-making and safety equipment -see for example the 2011 US National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council's Report [3] or the BP Report [4] into the Macondo blowout. However, this study will not dwell further on the chain of events leading to a blowout. Rather, two scenarios of interest are: (i) flow to the rig-floor via the marine riser, or (ii) flow to the seafloor, occurring via the main-bore of the well or via a casing annulus. In each case a failure of the blowout preventer (BOP) would be required in order for flow to enter the riser or be discharged to the sea.
A number of different possibilities and configurations exist within these two general scenarios. For example, flow to the rig-floor results from rig operations that lead to a reduction in hydrostatic pressure to below reservoir pressure and would require that the hydrocarbon influx to the wellbore went undetected. Other scenarios might include drilling into an overpressured formation, with formation fluid pressure higher than the mud hydrostatic pressure that sets off a series of events leading to a blowout. Another possible significant precursor event to a blowout is the catastrophic failure of the marine riser connecting the seabed wellhead to the rig [5] . Here, the consequent loss of the "riser margin" leads to an underbalanced condition in the wellbore, so promoting an influx of hydrocarbons.
In deepwater drilling parlance, the pressure difference between the hydrostatic pressure developed by the mud column within the riser and the surrounding seawater is called the "riser margin". The vertical length of this mud column in the riser extends from the mud flow line located below the rig floor of the floating rig (some distance above sea level) down to the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) that connects the riser to the BOP and subsea wellhead. After the riser is disconnected, only seawater hydrostatic is applied at the wellhead. This sudden loss of mud pressure presents a major well control problem. The deeper the water the greater the change in fluid pressure, as given by equation 1. where RTE = rotary table elevation above sea level; Depth = water depth; MW = mud weight in the riser; and SWD is the sea-water density. The value of the constant equals 0.05195 for pressure loss in psi with depths in ft and densities in pounds per gallon (ppg). The constant equals 0.0098 for pressure loss in MPa, depths in metres and densities in specific gravity (SG) units.
As an example, consider drilling in 5,000 ft water depth, with a drill floor elevation of 100 ft. If the mud density is 14.3 ppg (1.71 SG) and the seawater density is 8.60 ppg (1.03 SG), then losing the riser would cause a 1,555 psi pressure drop as the mud column is replaced by seawater hydrostatic pressure. In deep-water, the often high pore pressure and narrow drilling margin between pore pressure and fracture gradient in any hole section means that it is often impractical to drill with a mud weight that provides an adequate riser margin at all times (i.e. a mud weight that would at least balance pore pressure were the riser to be lost). In these circumstances, mud weights that provide only a nominal overbalance relative to pore pressure with a full mud column to surface are used, and any loss of riser integrity would lead to a loss in bottomhole pressure and result in underbalanced conditions down-hole. This can lead to a fluid influx and possible borehole collapse, depending upon the actual situation.
Literature Review & Occurrence of Bridging
One of the earliest compilations of blowouts on the Outer Continental Shelf of the United States (OCS) was presented by Danenberger [6] . Reviewing occurrences over a twenty-one year period , 87 blowouts occurred during the drilling of 21,436 wells. Most of the blowouts were attributable to shallow gas influxes and were of short duration: 18 (20.7%) stopped flowing in less than an hour; a cumulative total of 50 (57.5%) in less than a day; and a total of 73 (83.9%) in less than a week. Most (62 or 71.3%) of the wells stopped flowing when unconsolidated formations in the open borehole portion of the well either bridged or collapsed and sealed the well. Of the 62 flowing wells that bridged, 55 did so in less than a week. Of the wells that did not bridge, all but two were controlled by pumping mud or cement or by actuating the BOP. The two exceptions involved trapped gas that dissipated quickly after release. Although relief wells were initiated during several of the blowouts in Danenberger's compilation, all of the flowing wells were controlled by other means prior to completion of the relief wells.
The most quoted published reviews of blowout occurrence are those of Skalle et al [7] , [8] and Holand [9] . They also reviewed blowout records from the 1960s through the mid-90s. As such, their data provides only a review of past experiences from a subset of wells that does not include the large number of deepwater wells drilled since the mid-90s. Therefore, bridging risk and blowout duration represented in their data is not fully representative of all classes of wells being drilled today, or which will be drilled in the future. For this reason a short summary of pertinent data only will be presented here.
Skalle et al [7] , [8] present a statistical analysis of killing methods and consequences of 1013 blowouts experienced in wells drilled from 1960 to 1996 in Texas (826 wells) and on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS, 387 wells). They found that bridging accounted for 39.6% of the killed blowouts on the OCS. This was the most common cause of killing, as shown in Figure  1 . Weighted mud was the most common well control method applied in the Texas wells, accounting for 43% of the wells surveyed, as shown in Figure 2 . Only 16% of blowouts in Texas were killed by self-bridging, this being a reflection of the varied lithology possible across the State. Overall, considering both OCS and Texas data, two-thirds of the blowouts in the study either bridged or were killed by pumping weighted mud. Figure 3 shows the depth of blowouts in 800 wells drilled from 1960 to 1996 in Texas and OCS [7] . It should be noted that over this time period the total number of wells drilled deeper than 18,000 ft would have been relatively small, and so the preponderance of relatively shallow events is, in part, a reflection of the technology available at the time (both in terms of drilling and seismic). Superimposed on this figure are typical depth ranges for normally-and over-pressured formations typical of the US Gulf Coast region [10] . In both datasets (TX and OCS), three-quarters of all blowouts occurred at depths shallower than 10,000 ft, where formations are typically expected to be normally-pressured. Formations capable of flow over these depths would be unconsolidated, and any small overpressure likely due to gas-filled sands (potentially biogenic in nature) -either of limited extent, or sitting atop normally-pressured aquifers. The fairly rapid and successful self-killing of blowouts occurring at these depths is, therefore, a consequence of these pertinent geologic conditions (unconsolidated sands, modest overpressure and, oftentimes, an aquifer present).
Holand [9] presents a synthesis of 124 offshore blowouts that occurred on the outer continental shelf of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and in Norwegian and United Kingdom waters in the period from January 1980 to January 1994. The data are from the SINTEF Offshore Blowout Database. Holand shows that most blowouts occur during drilling (82 events, 66%). Work-over blowouts (19 events, 15%) occurred more often than completion and production blowouts. Of the blowout events that occurred when drilling, 29% occurred while actually drilling; 24% occurred while tripping; and 20% while running casing. Figure 4 summarizes the fluid produced during the reported blowouts. Data from both Skalle et al and Holand are presented here. Both indicate that gas is the most common blowout fluid. This is perhaps not surprising given that overpressured shallow gas hazards are common in the Gulf of Mexico Shelf and in deep-water, and that gas blowouts develop most quickly. Figure 5 shows the duration of blowout occurrence from Skalle et al's data. Holand's data, though presented over different time intervals, shows a similar cumulative distribution of blowout duration. The figure shows that 70% of the recorded blowouts were killed within 2 days. This statistic is consistent with data presented in Figures 1 and 2 which show that two-thirds of blowouts either bridged or were killed by pumping weighted mud, events that could happen quite soon after the blowout first occurred.
The historical Gulf Shelf databases promote the suggestion that a large proportion of shallow blowouts will be self-killing. (These are believed to have been largely due to drilling into limited-size "shallow hazard" gas pockets, often overlying normally-pressured water aquifers.) This perception has sometimes been applied to deeper-water well control events, where the question of self-killing has also arisen. However, more recent evidence from deeper-water shallow water flows does call into question the ability of significant flows from overpressured shallow saline aquifers to bridge-over within a reasonable time period, and without causing significant damage to well integrity and subsea infrastructure. Two relevant deepwater examples occurred at Ursa (Mississippi Canyon Blocks 809, 810, 853 and 854) [11] and at the Ozona prospect in Garden Banks Block 515 [12] . In both these examples, overpressured sands were encountered between 1,000 ft and 2,500 ft below mud line. The high pressure of these sands relative to their fracture gradient resulted in difficult drilling conditions in the upper hole sections at these locations, where the formations were drilled riserless using seawater or sacrificial weighted mud. In many cases the overpressured sands were drilled with insufficient mud density and the subsequent brine flows to the seafloor transported significant volumes of entrained sands and sediment from depth which resulted in buckling and collapse of well casings due to the loss of lateral support. In the case of the Ozona prospect, sustained brine flows around the surface casing of well Garden Banks 515-2 persisted for about nine months before flow ceased [11] . Recent Gulf of Mexico data (available from the former MMS) shows that between January 2005 and January 2009, thirty-five deepwater wells experienced shallow water flows; these were of low or minor severity. The duration of these flows is not known, but the available published literature from deep-water does not support the shallow-water view presented in Figure 5 that three-quarters of blowouts are over within 2 to 3 days. The larger volumes of overpressured shallow reservoir sands can flow for prolonged periods, and despite entraining large volumes of uncemented sediments do not appear to be self-killing through bridging mechanisms.
In the published literature there has been very limited attention given to analysis of self-killing blowouts. In one 2006 paper on the subject, Nesheli and Schubert [13] attempted to evaluate the bridging tendencies in deepwater wells using wellbore breakout analysis. They believed that the wider the breakout, the easier it would be for the well to be self-bridging during a blowout. However, they did not consider cavings volumes or transport (i.e. bridging), and the wellbore stability analysis approach employed is considered simplistic for this particular problem. Their analyses suggested that bridging would inevitably occur at depths greater than 2000 ft below mudline in wells drilled in 1000 ft water-depth, and at depths greater than 4000 ft below mudline in wells drilled in 10,000 ft water-depth. There is no field evidence to support this view, and indeed in this present work the key issues are seen to be the rate of borehole failure and the transport and bridging tendency of the failed borehole material, aspects of the problem that are not considered in the Nesheli and Schubert paper.
Other work relevant to the question of borehole collapse when subjected to "blowout-like" borehole pressure changes was conducted by Jourine et al [14] , [15] . In their work, fluid-saturated hollow-cylinder specimens of Berea Sandstone (with approximately 7000 psi / 48.3 MPa unconfined compressive strength and 710 psi / 4.9 MPa tensile strength) were subjected to rapid reductions in internal borehole pressure -over 5,800 psi / 40 MPa reduction in as little as 1 second. The externally applied stresses on the samples were of sufficient magnitude that borehole failure would be expected had simple "undrained" conditions of failure occurred. During truly undrained loading conditions, any reduction in borehole pressure that creates a differential pressure between the borehole fluid and pore fluid in the rock that is greater than the rock's tensile strength should cause borehole failure as a result of the creation of tensile radial stresses at the borehole wall. (A process that causes splintery cavings when drilling underbalanced, particularly in gasbearing tight rocks). The results and analysis of Jourine et al showed that poroelastic pressure changes within the rock were not as 'instantaneous' as the pressure changes within the central borehole and that the peak tensile stresses depend upon the timescale over which the boundary pressure is changed. A feature of Jourine et al's work is that the Berea Sandstone tested remained stable during the process of rapid pore pressure reduction. This observation calls into question whether the undrained failure 'rule-of-thumb' (pore pressure change > tensile strength) is realistic when considering borehole collapse; this suggests that moderately competent sandstones may not fail as perhaps expected during a blowout event.
Considering real-life examples of blowouts, a search of the Internet will provide various websites describing past events. Almost by definition, these prolonged blowouts released significant volumes of hydrocarbons and evidently did not bridge-over or suffer borehole instability sufficient to reduce the blowout rate. A brief description of some notable offshore blowouts is given below:
On January 28, 1969, a blowout occurred from well number 5 on Union Oil's Platform A at the Dos Cuadros field located in the Santa Barbara Channel, California. The blowout lasted eleven days and released an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 barrels oil. Insufficient mud weight while drilling resulted in a kick from the overpressured formation. Though the well was shut -in at the wellhead, an ensuing underground blowout (i.e. fracturing of the formation in the open uncased borehole) propagated fractures to seabed through which the oil and associated gas was able to flow. This event and the resulting pollution ultimately led to State and Federal bans on offshore drilling in California that remain in force today.
Starting on June 3, 1979, the Ixtoc I well blowout in Mexico's Bay of Campeche subsequently took 9 months to kill and released an estimated 3.5 million barrels (140 million gallons) of oil. A kick developed after losing returns caused by drilling into a zone of lowered fracture gradient (or fractured formation) at a depth of about 3,600 metres (11,800 ft) below mudline. Upon tripping out of the hole, a kick was swabbed into the well. Attempts were made to shut-in the well, but the drill-collars were inside the BOP stack at the time and these prevented the shear rams from cutting the pipe and the pipe rams from closing around the drill-string. The well was subsequently killed by drilling a relief well.
On August 21, 2009, a blowout occurred at the Montara Wellhead Platform located off the northwest Australian coast in the Timor Sea. The cement in the well and the float equipment failed to prevent flow from the reservoir into the casing. When the temporary suspension well cap was removed to begin completion operations, the BOP was not installed. This left the well open and flow began from the reservoir, eventually reaching the surface where it could not be controlled. The operator estimated that 400 barrels of crude oil were spilled per day, though Australian Governmental sources estimated that the leak rate could be as high as 2,000 bpd. The blowout continued until November 3, 2009 when the operator successfully completed a relief well and killed the Montara well after pumping approximately 3,400 bbls of heavy mud to kill the flow.
Details regarding the most recent Gulf of Mexico case -the Macondo well, drilled in Mississippi Canyon Block 252 -can be found in several in-depth investigations into the accident [3] , [4] .
BOEM NTL No. 2010-N06 on Worst Case Discharge As a consequence of post-Macondo regulation, the U.S. Department of Interior Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM, now the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, BSEE) Notice to Lessees (NTL) No. 2010-N06 requires Worst Case Discharge
Calculations (WCD) be made for all new well permits [16] . As part of these new regulations, it is necessary to consider each hydrocarbon-bearing hole section that will be drilled as a possible candidate for the Worst Case Discharge Scenario during an uncontrolled flow event. The Notice states that the following information is required:
"Provide a scenario for the potential blowout of the proposed well in your plan or document that you expect will have the highest volume of liquid hydrocarbons. Include the estimated flow rate, total volume, and maximum duration of the potential blowout. Discuss the potential for the well to bridge over, the likelihood for surface intervention to stop the blowout, the availability of a rig to drill a relief well, and rig package constraints. Specify as accurately as possible the time it would take to contract for a rig, move it onsite, and drill a relief well, including the possibility of drilling a relief well from a neighboring platform or an onshore location."
At present, the requirements for demonstrating the potential for bridging are not well defined. In its "Guidance for Complying with BOEM NTL No. 2010-N06 on Worst Case Discharge for Offshore Wells" [17] the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) advises that when considering "formation sloughing" the "BOEM guidance is to assume no formation sloughing or hole collapse within the calculation period. Although there is a high likelihood of formation solids production at high rates, the effect of solids production on hole conditions cannot be reliably estimated for most wells. Hole size will be assumed to be constant at the drilled diameter."
Immediately following, when discussing "bridging", the It is possible that analysis and analogs may be able to verify the bridging tendency of shallow-gas influxes in unconsolidated sediments, particularly if limited in volume or associated with water production. It is believed that deeper-water experiences of this occurring may be far fewer in number, however. For well locations where few offsets exist, or where well control events have been limited to small-volume kicks that were subsequently controlled, it is necessary that an appropriate methodology be developed to assess the potential for bridging, as the NTL allows. This requires an understanding of when "formation sloughing" and "bridging" might be expected to occur during a blowout.
Self-Killing Blowout Analysis Methodology
The apparent lack of attention by the petroleum geomechanics community to the question of borehole stability during a blowout has prompted this current work. The analysis approach suggested here considers a series of interrelated analytic or semi-analytic analyses that address individual aspects of the problem. This allows key assumptions and parametric uncertainties and sensitivities to be easily recognized and investigated. More complicated -and fully-integrated and coupled -numerical simulators could be developed in the future, but even here the individual problem elements need to be defined ahead of time. This paper sets out a series of applicable problem elements for each aspect of the problem. Four major analysis modules are envisioned: 
1) Kick-development analysis:
This determines how long it will take for the kick to develop into a blowout, and how the bottom-hole pressure and in-flow velocity changes during this time.
2) Assessment of borehole collapse: Knowing the bottom-hole pressure variation, the potential for wellbore failure in exposed shale and sand formations then needs to be assessed.
3) Cavings volume and transport analysis:
The cavings volume then has to be calculated from the time-varying evolution of the failure zone surrounding the borehole. Cavings transport should be assessed, taking into account the assumed geometries of failed material from the borehole wall and knowledge of the fluid velocity profile within the borehole. 4) Cavings bridging analysis: Bridging tendency should then be assessed by considering the concentration of cavings and spalled material within the borehole and cased portions of the wellbore. Any potential alterations or constrictions to flow -such as in regions of enlarged borehole diameter, partially-sheared wellbore tubulars through the BOP, or other tortuous flow-paths need to be considered, as these are all possible locations where particle settling or bridging may occur.
Representative Scenario Analyzed in this Study

In-Situ Stresses
The open-hole blowout scenario that will be illustrated using the proposed methodology has been based upon typical deepwater-like overburden, fracture gradient and pore pressure profiles ( Figure 6 ).
In the analyses, mudline is taken at 5100 ft depth below the rotary table, with a rotary table elevation of 100 ft above mean sea level. The water depth is therefore 5000 ft, with a mudline hydrostatic pressure of 2233 psi (a 1.03 SG sea-water density). A series of three oil-bearing sands are assumed, with an initial pressure of 13.0 ppg equivalent mud weight (EMW). These are also shown in Figure 7 , but in pressure units rather than equivalent mud weights. It is assumed that the well is drilled with a mud weight that is 0.3 ppg higher than the in-situ shale pore pressure. With reference to the earlier discussion of "riser margin", this mud weight is insufficient to provide overbalanced conditions should the additional hydrostatic pressure from the drilling mud in the marine riser be lost due to a loss of containment at mudline.
One blowout scenario, therefore, would be if the marine riser detaches from the BOP and the mud hydrostatic in the riser is lost. The 'instantaneous' bottomhole pressure and induced underbalance caused by losing the riser is also shown in Fig. 7 . Figure 8 presents a detailed view over the depth range 17,200 ft to 18,300 ft. In the analysis considered here it is further assumed that a 9⅝" casing is set at 17,200 ft TVD.BRT, so leaving a 850 ft-long shale section exposed above the top sand and, cumulatively, a total of 900 ft of exposed shale between the shoe and the base of Sand #3. For analyses of cuttings transport it is further assumed that 5½" drill-pipe is present in the borehole -i.e. the well is drilling ahead -at the time that the kick initiates.
In the profiles shown in Fig. 8 , losing the riser would impose a significant underbalance relative to shale pore pressure of about 1270 psi. This is large relative to the anticipated formation strength, and would be expected to give rise to some instability in the exposed shale sections. Losing the riser margin only modestly underbalances the sands -at least initially, based on this static analysis of pressure differentials. Using pressures predicted at average depths in the sands, the loss of the riser would create on average an underbalance of 277 psi in Sand #1; 260 psi in Sand #2 and 243 psi in Sand #3. Under these conditions the well would be expected to flow and the kick develop into a blowout should it not be possible to close the BOP. 
Geomechanical and Petrophysical Properties
Formation property parameters required in the subsequent analyses are principally related to strength and flow characteristics. For the shale formations over the depth range considered (17,200 -18 ,300 ft TVD.BRT) "typical GoM Shale" [18] data are used: 1600 psi unconfined compressive strength; 22° angle of friction; and 0.0001 mD permeability. For the sand intervals, values typical of high porosity, unconsolidated sands have been used: 50 psi unconfined compressive strength; 35° angle of friction; 455 psi thick-walled cylinder collapse strength; and 400 mD permeability. The sandstone reservoirs are assumed to have a combined productivity index of 30 bbl/day/psi. The hydrocarbon oil is assumed to have a specific gravity of 0.75; and a viscosity of 1.09 cP (at reservoir conditions). Using the profiles and input properties defined here, subsequent sections will address key aspects of the proposed "Wellbore Stability Approach for SelfKilling Blowout Assessment".
Kick-Development Analysis
To estimate the Worst Case Discharge and blowout rate, some form of nodal analysis is generally applied that matches inflow performance and vertical lift performance for the well [19] , [20] . In surface blowouts from platform wells, or wells onshore, the blowout rate is typically controlled by a sonic velocity outflow condition as the pressure in the wellbore often exceeds atmospheric pressure. In seabed blowouts (e.g. when the riser has parted) pressure conditions can be more complex as the wells blowout against a back-pressure provided by the hydrostatic pressure of the water column at mudline (or where the riser break occurs). In an oil blowout, gas breakout from solution is possible at some point in the wellbore. In a subsea well where the riser has parted this will depend upon the waterdepth (i.e. hydrostatic pressure), temperature and the bubblepoint of the flowing oil; gas volumes will also be a function of the gas-oil ratio of the fluid. If the water depth is great enough, seabed hydrostatic pressure may be greater than the bubblepoint of the oil; if this is the case the flow in the wellbore may be single-phase. Conversely, in wells where the marine riser is intact and the kick progresses above the wellhead, gas breakout will very likely occur at some point within the riser (or possibly in the wellbore below the wellhead, depending on conditions).
The required Worst Case Discharge calculations are for steady-state flow from the reservoir. In any calculation of bridging tendency it is recommended that these calculations be supplemented with transient multiphase well flow simulations that model the evolving bottomhole pressure variation as the kick develops. Dynamic flow simulators such as OLGA  may be used [21] , as they have the capability to model gas breakout from solution as well as the large frictional pressure-drops that can occur during high-rate multiphase flows. Analyses of the dynamic evolution of a blowout event show that substantial changes in bottomhole pressure can occur over a period of typically 15 minutes to 40 minutes duration as the produced hydrocarbons displace the drilling fluid from the borehole [22] , [23] . These more detailed analyses of the bottomhole pressure evolution during the development of a blowout provide useful input to calculations of transient borehole instability in order to assess whether early-time hole collapse and bridging is possible. For this present work two kick scenarios were modeled using OLGA  . These permitted simulation of the necessary multiphase physics of the problem, the densities and rheology of drilling fluid in the well and inflowing fluid, the instantaneous underbalance applied upon losing the riser, and the frictional pressure resistance to flow in the borehole. The result shown in Figure 9 is for the case of the riser-break scenario. The analysis indicates that the kick would take just over 22 minutes to develop into a blowout. Initially the bottomhole pressure would reduce from 13,480 psi (i.e. the hydrostatic pressure existing while drilling using a 14.3 ppg drilling fluid) to 11,925 psi at the time that the riser parted due to the loss of the riser margin. This would cause the sands (with initial pressures ranging from 12,196 psi to 12,297 psi) to be become underbalanced and the well would begin to flow. Over the duration of the kick the bottomhole pressure would reduce further to 6990 psi as the lighter hydrocarbons fill the wellbore.
The riser-break scenario represents a severe loading-case on the formation due to the sudden reduction in bottomhole pressure that "kick-starts" the blowout. Bottomhole flowing pressures may be slightly lower in the case of a flow through the riser to surface (by the differential between a hydrocarbon gradient from mudline to surface as opposed to seawater -approximately 600 psi for the case considered here), but the bottomhole pressure change is more gradual, at least initially, in the case where a swabbed influx goes unnoticed and the kick slowly develops as the hydrocarbons rise in the well and riser. For this reason the analyses reported here will focus on the riser break scenario. It is, however, interesting to note that the OLGA  simulations for the swabbed kick case took only slightly longer to develop into a full blowout compared with the riser break scenario. Here the slower start to the kick was compensated for at later time by the higher influx rate. Also, though the marine riser adds an additional volume that must be displaced by hydrocarbons, the higher influx rate from the formation and rapid displacement of drilling mud by exsolved gas within the riser resulted in a roughly similar time for the kick to reach the drill rig. This is considered coincidental for these particular analyses as the kick development time is sensitive to both water depth and riser volume.
Assessment of Borehole Collapse During the Development of a Kick
Of interest in this part of the analysis is the possibility for borehole collapse in deeper formations that might lead to situations where plugging or bridging may occur. Conditions leading to wellbore collapse due to a reduction in bottom hole pressure can be illustrated schematically through the use of a MohrCoulomb failure diagram, as shown in Figure 10 . As the bottom-hole pressure decreases the Mohr circle shifts to the left, so approaching the failure envelope of the formation. This failure envelope defines the boundary between permissible (i.e. "safe") and inadmissible (i.e. "failed") stress states. With the further decrease in bottom-hole pressure, the Mohr circle contacts the failure envelope and so wellbore instability occurs. In the context of a developing underbalance causing wellbore instability, it is important to note the difference between failure in weak and strong formations. In a weak formation, the attainment of near-balance pressure conditions results in a combined mode of both compressive and tensile failure. This is evidenced when drilling in the field by a mixture of splintery and angular cavings from weak shales -e.g. as might be seen when drilling into a pressure ramp (shown in the lower cavings picture in Fig. 10 ). In contrast, wellbore failure in strong formations is dominated by tensile failure, which is evidenced by predominantly splintery cavings, such as those that might be produced from a highly-overpressured gas well when drilling close-to or just under balanced conditions (left-most cavings picture). The size of the cavings from weak formations is also larger than those from strong formations, so making it more difficult for them to be carried to surface.
(a) Wellbore collapse in shale formations
Knowing the in-situ stresses and having predicted the mechanical properties of the formation, wellbore instability in exposed shale formations may be evaluated using conventional time-dependent (poroelastic) wellbore stability analysis. Here an analysis performed for the mid-height of the open borehole is considered representative of failure of the entire interval. Figure 11 illustrates the results from the wellbore stability model once the initial underbalance pressure is applied to the exposed shale formations due to the riser disconnecting. Figure 12 shows the extent of wellbore instability when the kick is fully developed, having reached the seabed. Here the borehole pressure is assumed to reduce from 11,170 psi to 6,934 psi over a 20 minute period.
The plots on the left-hand side of Figs. 11 and 12 show the pore pressure profile around the well. The right-hand plots show, for a given location around the well, the minimum rock strength (UCS) that is required to prevent wellbore failure. By specifying the formation strength, the black line shows the extent to which the formation surrounding the borehole is expected to fail; i.e. the line presents a contour of required rock strength equivalent to that specified in the analysis. Locations within the black line are predicted to fail and cause extensive breakouts. It is seen by comparing the left-hand plot in Figs. 11 and 12 that the majority of the borehole failure is predicted to occur at the time that the riser breaks; the failure zone increases only slowly over time as the bottom-hole pressure reduces during the kick development. Upon losing the riser the radial extent of the failure zone is 1.2 times the borehole radius; this suggests a 10.2-inch diameter enlarged borehole for an 8½-inch drilled borehole. After 22 minutes, as the kick develops, the failure zone extent extends to 1.28 times the borehole radius (10.9 inches for an 8½-inch borehole).
The state of stress existing within the failed region of the borehole is shown in Figure 13 . The three pertinent effective stresses -acting in a radial, axial and circumferential ("hoop") direction -may be represented by three circles of stress in a Mohr's Circle diagram. Shear and tensile failure envelopes for shale are also shown. Where the Mohr's circles lie outside of the rock's failure envelopes, rock failure occurs. Fig. 13 shows that upon the imposition of underbalanced conditions in the borehole, three modes of instability occur. Mode (1) is due to the radial tension into the borehole exceeding the rock's tensile strength. Modes (2) and (3) are different forms of shear failure. Mode (3), involving the effective hoop stress as the largest stress, is the familiar wellbore breakout mode of failure. Mode (2) is an additional failure mechanism, where the differential stress acting parallel to the borehole axis relative to the radial stress is also high enough to cause failure. The prevalence and severity of the modes of instability occurring when the well goes underbalanced are considered sufficient to cause severe instability within the affected zone where formation strength is exceeded. Further discussion on the possible rate of borehole collapse is provided in Appendix A. Figure 8 shows that for the scenario being analyzed, losing the drilling fluid hydrostatic in the riser imposes a drawdown pressure on the three sands, varying from 277 psi average drawdown in the topmost sand to 243 psi average drawdown in the lowest sand. Fig. 9 shows that the during the development of the kick the bottomhole flowing pressure in the wellbore reduces by a further 4935 psi so increasing the underbalance to 5255 psi -5175 psi. Under such severe flow conditions spalling and borehole collapse may occur in the exposed sandstone. This additional produced material, together with that from the failing shale sections, is what may potentially provide a sufficient volume of material that the borehole flow is impeded and slowed by the weight of the entrained sand such that the borehole bridges and the kick kills itself. To assess the sand influx, the analytical method proposed by Willson et al. (2002) [24] is used. A complete description of the model is given in this reference and a further recapitulation of relevant equations will not be made here. Broadly speaking, the model is comparable to the analyses conduced for shale. The rate of sand production is correlated with extent of rock failure based on the results of large-scale sand production laboratory tests. The model may be used for open boreholes, as well as the more conventional cased and perforated completions, provided suitable borehole failure scaling relationships are applied. These are necessary as it has been shown that large samples fail at lower levels of applied stress relative to small-scale samples [25, 26] (i.e. unsupported large-diameter boreholes are less stable than perforation tunnels). Results of sanding analyses during the kick flow are shown in Table 1 . For the high flow rates predicted during the kick from 30 bbl/d/psi PI formations, considerable sand production is predicted, at least on a sustained production basis. Knowing the sand production rate in pounds per thousand barrels (pptb) and borehole geometry, the weight of sand in the wellbore is calculated. While the eventual sand production rate and total weight of the suspended sand in the wellbore appears large at first sight (almost three tons), the added hydrostatic pressure in the borehole annulus is actually quite modest (ca. 180 psi at most). Similarly, the sand concentration in the flowing hydrocarbons is also low. Taking a 2.65 g/cc sand density, the 519 pptb sanding rate is equivalent to only 0.56 bbls of sand in 1000 bbls of fluid; the higher rate of 5,043 pptb is equivalent to 5.43 bbls of entrained sand. The solids concentration from sand is, therefore, quite low and -as shown in subsequent sections -insufficient to alter the dynamics of the kick development.
(b) Wellbore collapse in sand formations
Thus, in this analysis the effects of the produced sand mixed with the hydrocarbon flow is insignificant to affect the overall fluid column density within the wellbore. Here, it is concluded that in situations of Worst Case Discharge from prolific deepwater reservoirs sand influx cannot be relied upon to stem the progression of the blowout; i.e. bridging will not occur from the contribution of produced sand alone.
Cavings Transport Analysis
While it may be possible for the shale cavings volume to be large enough to plug the wellbore, self-killing may not happen if the flow velocity is sufficient to carry the cavings to surface as they are produced from the failing borehole wall. To address this, a cavings transport analysis is required. The analytical model described here is based on the following simplifying assumptions: (i) all particles have the same size (though more sophisticated analyses considering a range of particle sizes could be performed using this model also); (ii) inter-particle collision and packing is ignored (though this is considered separately later); and (iii) the fluid flow in the wellbore is a single phase. The method developed and published by Chien [27] is used here: ]; and  p = particle density [g/cm 3 ]. Sphericity is defined as  A s /A P , where A p is the surface area of the caving particle; and A s is the surface area of a sphere with the same volume. Typical cavings from a Gulf of Mexico well suffering instability are shown in Figure 14 [28] . Taking a cavings dimension of 1"  1"  ¼", sphericity is calculated to be 0.64. Taking a shale density of 2.2 g/cm 3 and flowing oil property values defined previously, the effects of equivalent diameter on the settling velocity of cavings can be calculated using Eq. Figure 15 shows the effective settling velocity of cavings of various sizes as a function of blowout flow rate in an 8½" borehole, both with and without drill-pipe present. [28] For the particular analysis case being considered here (cavings dimension of 1"  1"  ¼") the settling velocity is predicted to be 1.42 ft/sec, equivalent to a flow rate of 8,580 bbl/day in an 8½" borehole without drill-pipe being present, or 4,988 bbl/day for flow in an 8½"  5½" annulus. For a formation with a PI of 30 bbl/day/psi, this flow rate would be achieved for a drawdown of 286 psi (with no drill-pipe) or 166 psi for the case of annulus flow. This is equivalent to the underbalance applied to the sands upon losing the riser margin. As the formation begins to flow, influx analyses indicate that this flow rate is surpassed roughly three minutes after the well begins to flow.
The early-time behavior of the kick development is, therefore, very crucial to the understanding of whether self-bridging will occur. In particular, the rate of formation collapse following the imposed drawdown from losing the riser will dictate whether shale cavings will accumulate in the open borehole section and potentially bridge against the drill-pipe in the borehole, or whether the kick influx rate will increase sufficiently so that shale cavings will be produced along with the flow in the wellbore. In lower PI scenarios it is possible that the flow rate may be insufficient, and here cavings settling would occur. In high PI scenarios this analysis suggests that cavings transport flow velocities would be attained quite early-on in the kick development and here bridging may be less unlikely, depending upon the rate of borehole failure. Further discussion on this is presented in the Appendix.
Cavings Bridging Analysis
The analyses above have shown that during a blowout, high flow rates may effectively transport spalled material. Depending upon the geometry of the flow paths necessary for the hydrocarbons to reach the wellhead, bridging may possibly occur where constrictions to flow exist. Similar to heavy traffic on a freeway, high concentrations of solids slow the flow due to the impact that the suspended solids have on the effective fluid viscosity. The effect of suspended solids on viscosity was first studied by Albert Einstein in 1906 [29] . In this study, extensions to Einsteins' work by Frankel and Acrivos [30] and Pabst [31] are used. The fundamental concept involved with cavings bridging is that as the solids concentration, φ, approaches the critical concentration, φ c , the effective viscosity tends to infinity and flow stops. The critical concentration of monodisperse spheres is 0.64 [30] . The critical concentration of irregularly-shaped cavings is expected to be lower than this. In the minerals processing literature, critical concentrations of crushed rock slurries (arguably more relevant to cavings transport) indicate critical concentrations of ca. 0.5 are appropriate [32] . A viscosity multiplier, , that takes into consideration the concentration of solid particles can be calculated from established relationships. One such relationship for the viscosity multiplier attributed to Brule and Jongschaap [33] for high-concentration slurries is given by: The previous analysis for time-dependent instability in shale has shown that the failure zone extends to 1.28 times the original borehole diameter (10.9" for an 8½" diameter borehole). Considering representative areas, the annular area of the failed solids is 36.6 in 2 and the area of the enlarged borehole is 93.3 in 2 if drill-pipe is not present in the borehole, and 69.6 in 2 (equivalent to a 10.9"  5½" annulus) if the drill-pipe is present.
If all this material falls into the borehole at the same instant, and if the drill-pipe is present, then the maximum solids concentration possible is 0.53 (i.e. = 36.6/69.6). This is sufficiently close to the estimated critical concentration for angular particles that bridging of the annulus will occur. This scenario would be similar to becoming packed-off in a poorly-cleaned borehole.
In the case where there is no drill-pipe in the hole, the solids concentration is 0.39 (i.e. = 36.6/93.3); this gives a φ/φ c ratio of 0.785 (for a critical concentration of 0.5). Using Eq. 3, the viscosity multiplier, , equals 7.69. Using a more complex relationship developed by Pabst [31] ,  is predicted to be 8.98. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume a viscosity multiplier of about 8 occurring in the case of the 8½" borehole loading-up with cavings spalled from the borehole wall. Although the flow rate will be slowed by the increase in effective viscosity of the kick/cavings mixture, the dynamics of the kick evolution will dictate whether significant spalling could sufficiently impede its progress (via increased viscosity effects) such that the cavings are no-longer suspended in the flow, they settle, and so plug the borehole. Here, the timing of the instability again becomes important. If failed material remains in-place initially, but collapses suddenly into the borehole then the possibility for this mechanism of bridging to apply in an open-borehole depends upon the prevailing flow rate at the time instability occurs. Referring to Fig. 15 and the cavings settling analyses discussed previously, if sudden borehole failure occurs late in the development of the kick the 'choked' flow rate will still be sufficient to transport the cavings. Table 1 shows that a flow rate of 68,220 bbls/day will be achieved after only 5 minutes. If shale collapse were to occur at this time, the flow rate of the kick/cavings mixture could be reduced to 8,528 bbl/day (i.e. by applying a viscosity multiplier of 8). This is roughly the same as the 8,580 bbl/day settling velocity for flow in an 8½" borehole without drill-pipe present. Thus, for the particular problem described here, instability occurring during a kick with drill-pipe not present in the 8½" borehole is unlikely to lead to bridging, as flow rates will exceed the cavings settling velocity -even for slowed flow due to the presence of cavings. However, bridging between the borehole wall and drill-pipe is possible by achieving critical solids concentrations in situations where instability occurs with drill-pipe present in the 8½" borehole.
Conclusions
A four-step analysis approach for assessing the potential for a blowout to be self-killing has been proposed:
Kick-development analysis: determines how long it will take for the kick to develop into a blowout, and how the bottom pressure and in-flow velocity changes during this time. Analyses indicate that riser failures that expose the borehole to a sudden underbalance pressure are necessary to create conditions where bridging may potentially occur. More slowly-developing blowouts (e.g. a swabbed kick developing into a blowout) are unlikely to result in bridging.
Analysis of borehole collapse: assesses the potential for wellbore failure in exposed shale and sand formations. Results of this study suggest that kicks from high productivity, overpressured sands will not entrain sufficient produced sand with the hydrocarbon flow to significantly impede the development of the blowout. The significant changes in borehole pressure caused by a failure of the marine riser both kick-start the influx of fluids and trigger instability that can lead to conditions where bridging potentially occurs.
Cavings volume and transport analysis: considers the time-varying evolution of the failure zone surrounding the borehole, taking into account the geometry of failed material from the borehole wall. Analyses show that cavings transport flow velocities will be achieved early-on in the development of the kick (i.e. before the hydrocarbon influx reaches the wellhead). The timing of borehole failure relative to kick development therefore becomes a key factor in whether a potential blowout will become self-killing.
Cavings bridging analysis: considers the concentration of cavings and spalled material within the borehole and cased portions of the wellbore, taking into account any potential constrictions to flow. The analyses show that kick-incurring events while drilling ahead in an 8½" borehole are most favorable for bridging, as spalled shale cavings plug the borehole annulus. Events occurring in larger hole sizes, or when drill-pipe is not in the borehole, are unlikely to bridge.
It is hoped that this analysis approach provides new clarity to the factors influencing the interaction between exposed formations in the open borehole, evolving bottomhole pressures during a kick that develops into a blowout, and possible bridging mechanisms that might impede the development of a blowout. The principal conclusion of this study has been that in order for a blowout to be selfkilling, bridging has to occur while the kick is developing within the borehole. Bridging between the drill-pipe and borehole wall is the most likely cause for self-killing; kicks occurring with the drill-pipe not in the open-hole (e.g. while tripping) are unlikely to bridge, however. The analyses indicate that once the kick is sufficiently developed that hydrocarbons reach the wellhead -i.e. a blowout is underway -self-killing is no-longer a possibility, at least in the short-term while near-initial reservoir conditions apply. The overpressured nature of many deepwater reservoirs is such that high flow-rates occurring early-on in the development of a kick may be sufficient to remove all spalled shale or produced formation sand along with the hydrocarbon flow. The typically large reservoir energy of these deepwater reservoirs means that once developed a deepwater blowout can flow for extended periods before natural causes (such as depletion, water production, etc) result in a diminishing flow rate. This is the principal differentiator between blowouts in deep-water and those historically recorded from Shelf wells which intersect "shallow hazard" gas pockets of limited extent, the majority of which can be controlled within 24 hours of a blowout occurring. [35] Appendix A -Discussion on Rate of Borehole Collapse The bridging tendency of the borehole predicated on the assertion that shale will spall from the borehole wall relatively quickly after underbalanced conditions are imposed on the exposed formations as a consequence of losing the riser margin and a kick developing into a blowout. The analyses have speculated that 'prompt' failure of the borehole wall is necessary to arrest the full development of the blowout before hydrocarbons reach sea-bed or wellhead. It is necessary that the required borehole failure will occur both within the time necessary to prevent the kick from developing into a blowout and to such an extent that plugging will occur within the annulus or other constriction within the flow path to the wellhead. Three sources of evidence exist to assess the likely rapidity and severity of borehole collapse: (i) anecdotal field evidence; (ii) direct observations of the timing of developing borehole instability; and (iii) laboratory experiments of borehole collapse in shale.
Anecdotal evidence
Anecdotal -though largely unpublished -field evidence of rapid borehole collapse exists when drilling into overpressured shales and exiting salt into formations at higher pore pressure than the mud weight used. Here spalling and pack-offs can develop quite quickly. They can occur within tens of feet of exiting salt or drilling into overpressure or during the time it takes to flow-check the well and make a connection. At typical drilling rates of penetration this implies instability develops over a time-period of less than one hour. This is not inconsistent with the time required for a kick to develop into a blowout.
Direct Observations of Borehole Instability
Borehole imaging tools are frequently ran in wells to provide geologic information on the formations being drilled -for example, in 'geosteering' applications where the well is drilled to follow certain reservoir horizons. These tools, profiling resistivity or density variations azimuthally around the borehole circumference, enable a 'pseudo-image' to be constructed of the borehole surface. These images can be used to discriminate bedding effects, irregularities, breakouts and fractures on the wellbore wall. For example, low density zones imaged on the borehole wall would correspond to wellbore enlargements from the creation of breakouts.
One particular tool of relevance to this discussion on the timing of borehole failure is the "Resistivity-at-the-Bit" (RAB) loggingwhile-drilling (LWD) tool [34] . This LWD tool is located very near the drill bit, typically within 30 ft. Thus, the RAB tool acquires a borehole image often 10 to 30 minutes after the rock has been drilled. The RAB tool records azimuthal data simultaneously at three depths of investigation -1, 3 and 5 inches. These data are represented as shallow, medium and deep images, respectively. Figure A1 , reproduced from Bratton et al shows the occurrence of breakouts (parallel, dark vertical smudges in the borehole image) as imaged by the RAB tool.
In Fig. A1 , the breakouts occur opposite each other, and are separated by a total of 180° circumferentially, center to center. Formation strength varies with lithology, which explains why the occurrence of breakouts is interrupted vertically in this image. The wellbore stability analysis (the lower right plot in Fig. A1 ) predicts a bi-winged breakout, each wing encompassing about 80° of the borehole circumference. The RAB image shows that the depth of the breakout is between 3 inches and 5 inches into the formation at its maximum depth.
Bratton et al [34] state that the modestly-deviated well was drilled with a 9.5 ppg mud weight in an assumed normally-pressured environment; i.e. the well was being drilled using an acceptable overbalanced mud weight. The RAB image shows that breakouts of a depth similar to that predicted by this study can develop quickly, within minutes of the borehole being drilled. This is seen as additional supporting evidence of the speed at which breakouts can form in a well. Figure A2 shows another RAB image, this time from McNeill at al [35] . The three panels show the resistivity images at 1-inch, 3-inches and 5-inches depth of investigation. Breakouts are clearly seen extending to a depth of 5-inches into the formation. These [38] images were recorded within 30 minutes of the rock first being drilled, again showing the rapidity of borehole failure. Again it should be emphasized that these breakouts were generated under acceptable conditions of overbalanced drilling.
Laboratory Experiments
A third source of supporting evidence of rapid borehole collapse in shale comes from laboratory experiments performed on "thick-walled cylinder" (TWC) collapse tests. These typically comprise a cylindrical sample with a central borehole that is stressed to failure to mimic borehole instability in the field. The samples are necessarily small-scale, a routine TWC sample having 1½" outside diameter, ½" inner diameter and being 3" in length. Larger shale samples, of 8" outside diameter, 2" inner diameter and 16" in length have also been tested as part of proprietary research studies. Their small size notwithstanding, significant efforts have been made to interpret the failure of these small-scale samples and to understand the up-scaling issues necessary to apply the test results to field situations -see for example Crook et al [36] . Two types of thick-walled cylinder experiments are of relevance to the instability modes predicted during a blowout. The first relates to a testing set-up where the external radial stress applied to the outside of the sample is increased until failure of the inner borehole occurs. This is the most common and simplest type of test performed. The second kind of test, of direct relevance to the underbalanced conditions being analyzed in the blowout scenario, involves starting the experiment from defined conditions of externally applied stress, internal borehole pressure, and a known and prescribed pore fluid pressure within the shale sample. The test is then conducted by reducing the internal borehole pressure (generating an underbalanced condition in the near-borehole region) until the borehole fails. This is the more complicated experiment to perform, as it requires good control and knowledge of the fluid pore pressure in the shale sample. This is time-consuming and difficult to establish in the laboratory due to the low permeability of the shale. Fortunately, there have been laboratory investigations that have addressed this more complicated scenario.
The first experimental laboratory program involves research at the Civil Engineering Department of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Cambridge, MA [37] . The focus of the work is to better understand wellbore instability mechanisms in strong soils and weak rock. The clay materials being tested are weaker than shales found in the Gulf of Mexico, but the governing physics is considered to be the same. The samples were artificially fabricated in the laboratory, such that they possess identical mechanical properties. Figure A3 compares the results of TWC testing, by either increasing external pressure until collapse of the inner borehole occurs, or reducing the internal borehole pressure until collapse occurs. In both tests the rate of pressure change was the same. Of relevance here is that the variation of effective radial stress versus borehole cavity volume strain is identical in the two types of experiment; i.e. both the magnitude of deformation (and, by inference, failure) of the sample and the rate at which it occurs is the same irrespective of whether stress is increased externally on the sample, or pressure decreased in the inner borehole. This is considered to be an important observation, as it shows that the underbalance mode of instability proceeds at the same pace as the breakout mode of instability generated by increasing external stress.
In a comparable laboratory suite of testing, SINTEF Petroleum Research, Trondheim, Norway, performed similar TWC experiments, by applying either increasing external stress or reducing internal borehole pressure, to carefully prepared samples of outcrop and overburden shales [38] . Their results are presented in Figure A4 . In the SINTEF testing, shales having unconfined compressive strengths of between 2 MPa (290 psi) and 39 MPa (5655 psi) were used. The underbalanced tests (failed by reducing internal borehole pressure) are denoted by blue diamonds in Fig. A4 , and referred to as "UB 0" in the figure. (The "0" designates that the samples were cored perpendicular to bedding. The samples failed by increasing external stress were cut at specified orientations from the rocks provided). The SINTEF results support those obtained by MIT, and show that the failure developed by underbalanced conditions in these small-scale samples is equivalent to that generated by increasing external stress. Thus, there is no 'delayed response' by the formation failing in underbalanced conditions compared with that from imposed external stress.
Concluding Remarks
In this Appendix we have presented a variety of borehole failure observations, or inferences where hard facts are less certain, to present the case that borehole failure is considered to be a sufficiently rapid phenomenon upon the imposition of underbalanced pressure conditions in the borehole that the borehole is expected to fail within the timescale of the developing kick (less than 30 minutes). Field evidence has shown that when drilling with insufficient mud weight, the drill-pipe can become stuck during the time it takes to make a connection (minutes only). This can occur at underbalances smaller than that which will be imposed in the event of a riser break.
Borehole images, collected by near-bit imaging tools, have shown that breakouts extending more than 5 inches into the formation can be developed very quickly -within 30 minutes of drilling -under acceptable overbalanced drilling conditions. It is anticipated that the more severe borehole stress state generated by a riser break would create more instability and in a shorter timeframe than seen in borehole images during normal drilling operations.
Finally, laboratory results on model borehole collapse experiments are presented. These show that instability in these small-scale samples proceeds at the same rate, and with the same severity, irrespective of whether the instability is generated by reducing internal borehole pressure or increasing external stress on the outside of the sample. Thus, there is no reason to expect that failure by imposing underbalanced conditions should occur slower than that resulting from having insufficient mud weight to resist the externally existing earth stresses.
